Organized Crime in Sweden: an analysis of the Syriac mafia in the city of Södertälje

2015-12-09

Organized Crime in Sweden: an analysis of “the Syriac mafia” in the city of Södertälje NB. First draft – do not quote without the permission of the authors

Paper presented at the General Conference of the ECPR-Standing Group on Organised Crime: Old and New Forms of Organised and Serious Crime between the Local and the Global, University of Naples Federico II, Department of Political Sciences, 11-12 December 2015. Panel D4: Organised crime in Europe.

Carina Gunnarson Department of Government Uppsala University Box 514, S-751 20 Uppsala, SWEDEN [email protected]

Amir Rostami Department of Sociology Stockholm University S-106 91 Stockholm, SWEDEN [email protected]

Abstract Sweden represents a least likely case for the development of mafia-like organisations: the state is strong with relatively well-functioning legal system; the political institutions are stable, trust in government is widespread, bureaucratic ethic is high and associational life vibrant. Yet, in a relatively short time, starting in the early 1980s, the so-called “Syrian network” has established its power structure in Södertälje, which is a medium-sized city in the proximity of Stockholm. In September 2014 the Svea Court of Appeal in Stockholm confirmed the existence of a criminal organisation in Södertälje, with an extensive power structure with ramifications into politics and the welfare sector. This paper focuses on the so-called Syriac mafia and analysis of its history, organizational structure, leadership, recruitment, and activities. Key-words: Organised crime, Sweden, “the Syriac mafia”, Södertälje.

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1. Introduction On the night of July 1, 2010 two armed men dashed into the gambling club Oasen in Södertälje, where about ten persons were sitting playing cards. The men approached two persons and shot them at close range with several shots. The Court described the assassinations as a pure execution. The killed men were two brothers belonging to a wellknown family in the Syrian/Assyrian community in Södertälje; the younger brother was a football star. Both were known for their involvement in illegal gambling, loan sharking, and the extortion of debts.1 The double murder in Södertälje represented the start of one of the biggest criminal investigations in Swedish legal history, including 20 000 pages and 62 trial days at a financial cost of more than 200 million Swedish crowns.2 Seventeen people were prosecuted and sentenced for murders, attempted murder, kidnapping, extortion, and abuse of judicial procedures. More so, the trial revealed an extensive criminal power structure with ramifications in politics and welfare sector at the local.3 The Swedish authorities stated they were acting against an economic parallel structure that exploits the Swedish welfare system. This far, the fight against organized crime in Södertälje has led to the prosecution of 122 persons and verdicts representing more than 160 years in prison.4 Sweden represents a “least likely case” for the development of mafia-like organizations that affect the public sector and society in general. The political institutions are stable, trust in government is generally widespread among citizens, the judicial system is well-functioning, and there is an extensive public sector that provides welfare services. In addition, there is an administrative ethic against corruption which is highly developed in a comparative perspective. Organizational life is strong and vibrant. Still, researchers on corruption note that new public management that was introduced during the 1990sincreased the potential for corruption at the municipal level. In the Swedish system the main task of local government is the provision of welfare serviced, including primary and secondary schools, child care, elderly care, health care, individual welfare services and cultural and recreational services. At the local level, new public management means that the public sector is responsible for both the funding and the specification of services, but the actual provision of services is partly outsourced to private actors (Larson & 1

Case B2781-10. 1 Euro = 9,271 Swedish crowns. 3 Svea Hovrätt [The Svea Court of Appeal], Press release, 1/9 2014. 4 Dagens Nyheter, 1/11 2015, “Södertälje håller andan inför polisens reträtt”. 2

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Bäck, 2008: 218, 227). These reforms have opened up for private actors, but at the same time created new opportunities for corrupt activities (Andersson & Erlingsson, 2010; Castillo, 2014). In a Swedish context, the Syriac mafia in the City of Södertälje represents an extreme case of organized crime. Institutionally, the city does not differ from other Swedish towns and municipalities. Moreover, the city lacks previous experiences of this type of organized crime. Criminal organizations exist also elsewhere in Sweden, most of them active in the southern parts of the country, but they are less organized and have not influenced politics and society to the same extent as in the city of Södertälje. The paper is organized as follows: next follows a description of the city of Södertälje. The third section discusses different perspectives on organized crime. The forth section presents the material used in this paper, followed by a brief overview of organized crime in Sweden. The sixth section describes the Syriac mafia in Södertälje, with a particular focus on organizational structure including leadership, internal division of labor, activities, resources, and internal cohesion. Thereafter follows a concluding discussion..

2. The city of Södertälje The Syriac mafia has developed in a city that lack previous tradition of organized crime. It has developed during a relatively short period of time, during the past decades. Despite the proximity to Stockholm, Södertälje is a city in itself with a long history. Founded during the 600’s, it was for centuries an important transport route for shipping between Lake Mälaren and the Baltic Sea. The inhabitants in Södertälje often describe themselves as “Tälje Tokar” (Södertälje fools) and the city as “Kringelstan” (City of pretzels).5 During the 19th century Södertälje was known as a spa and seaside resort. Today, it is mainly known for its production of vehicles (Scania) and pharmaceutical production (Astra). The city is characterized by a rich cultural life and strong presence of different sport associations. The major sport clubs have extensive youth activities and teams at the elite level.6 Södertälje also has its own local and daily newspaper, Länstidningen.

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Women used to sell wheat pretzels to travelers who passed Södertälje railway station on their way to Stockholm. 6 The hockey team SSK plays in the highest tier; the basketball club SBBK has two teams, male and female, both in the highest tier. Assyriska FC was promoted to the highest tier in Swedish football in 2010, for the first time in the club’s history. Todays it plays in the second highest tier, Superettan.

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With its industrial base, Södertälje is one of the traditional strongholds of the Social Democratic Party.7 The percentage of inhabitants with higher education (university level) is 18% compared with 25% for Sweden as a whole. The median income is lower than the average in Sweden, 231 771 SEK/year compared with 240 690 SEK/year, and the open unemployment is almost 15% in Södertälje which is higher than the Swedish average (8%).8 Södertälje is a multicultural city – about half of the city’s residents have a foreign background. The 1960s were characterized by labor immigration to Sweden, primarily from Finland and southern Europe, while the mid-1970s immigration groups mainly originated from the Middle East.9 From the 1970s and thereafter, Södertälje developed into the metropolis for the Assyrian/Syrian community in Sweden. A total of 100 000 persons with Assyrian/Syrian origin currently live in Sweden; about a quarter of them resides in Södertälje (Lundgren 2014: 103). Today, the city has a population of about 91 000. With the exception for the early 1980s when the city’s so-called “raggare”10 attacked and burnt establishments belonging to immigrants, the city was peaceful during the 1980s. Today, the city is characterized by residential segregation: inhabitants with an ethnic Swedish background tend to live in other areas than the immigrant populations – or move to other cities in Södertälje’s proximity.11 In the elections in 2014 the anti-immigration party Sweden democrats (SD) received 13,2% of the vote in the local elections.12

3. Perspectives on organized crime A large share of the literature on organized crime is dedicated to conceptual discussions about definitions of organized crime. Definitions have varied over time: from definitions that emphasize criminal structures with clear hierarchy and centralized leadership to definitions that define organized crime as criminal enterprises involved in illegal activities, and definitions that focus on criminal network structures (Varese, 2010: 2). With a structural perspective, the focus is on the cohesion and organization of the criminal group. This type of definitions are clearly inspired by criminal organizations such as the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and highlights factors such as leadership, hierarchical structures, division 7

In the elections to the City Council in 2014, the three largest parties were the Social Democrats (34.7%), the right-wing Conservatives (17.9%) and the anti-immigration party Sweden Democrats (13.2%). Other parties: Environmentalists (8,5%), the Left (6,5%), Christian democrats (5,5%), the Center party (4,8%), other (2,5%). 8 Ekonomifakta, http://www.ekonomifakta.se/Fakta/Regional-statistik/Din-kommun-i-siffror/ 9 In 2014 9,8% of its population were from other nordic countries, 19,8% from Europe and Turkey; 35,9% from Asia; 3,9% from Africa; 2,3% from South America; 0,6% from North- and Central America and 27,7% other countries. Source: The municipality of Södertälje, 2014. 10 Member of a gang of youths who ride about in cars. 11 Interview with Boel Godner, local government commissioner, Södertälje. Fokus No. 45 2011.”Södertälje håller andan”. 12 National, regional and local elections are held the same day. The SD received 12,9% at the national level.

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of labor, internal discipline, initiation rites, recruitment, shared identity, social and territorial control. Other definitions define criminal groups as “illegal enterprises” with a focus on its criminal activities, for example drug trafficking, trafficking or arms smuggling. Hence, organized crime is defined through its involvement in criminal economic activities. It also emphasizes the importance of economic profit as a motivation for criminal activities. (Paoli, 2002). Another type of definition highlights the flexible structure of the criminal group, analyzing various forms of networks that develop and change depending on internal and external changes (Morselli, 2009: 11). With a network perspective, different forms of organization are analyzed: from ad hoc cooperation to more stable and persistent patterns of cooperation. Networks can be based both on friendship, kinship, social background, or the sharing of a common resources or interest. Criminal opportunities develop within these networks (Varese, 2010: 8). A critique of the structural definitions of organized crime is that most criminal organizations are hierarchical and disciplined. Yet, most criminal groups are smaller and of more volatile character (Briquet & Favarel-Garrigues, 2010: 3; Finckenauer, 2005). A criticism of definitions that define organized groups based on their criminal activities is that they ignore that several major criminal organizations engaged in a variety of activities that are not strictly illegal. This applies in particular to mafia organizations such as the Japanese Yakuza, the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the Chinese Triads. In many cases, the organizations have existed long before they become involved in illegal business (Paoli, 2002: 63). Network definitions have the advantage of paying attention to the relationship between different types of actors, both legal and illegal. It could be used for example, in the analysis of different distribution chains, for example in drug trafficking. Its weakness is that the strength or the cohesion between various players is not studied. Networks are mobilized to implement a particular transaction, but it could be unclear to those who participate in such actions that they actually belong to a larger network (Paoli, 2002: 67-68). The literature on organized crime also discusses how organized crime can be distinguished from other criminal activities. One important difference is that criminal organizations are stable over time than “normal” criminality. If an individual is removed from the organization, it still remains. Violence or the reputation of violence is used against other and competing criminal groups, civilians who opposes to their activities, or representatives of the state. Membership is often restricted and based on ethnicity, kinship, or other shared characteristics. Criminal organization normally lack ideology but has an interest in economic profit, be it 5

from illegal activities or legal businesses, or the grey area between legality and illegality. Often, but not always, it tries to avoid government interference by influencing, infiltrating or corrupting public authorities. Yet, criminal organizations often differ in their degrees of criminal sophistication (planning, expertise, and skills), structure (division of labor, leadership, and continuity), identification (loyalty to the group) and reputation (threat of violence force) (Finckenauer, 2005: 65-76).

4. Material The lack of scientific literature is striking regarding organized crime in the Nordic countries in general and Sweden in particular. The literature on organized crime largely focus on southern European countries, in particular Italy, while only a few studies on organized crime in the Nordic countries (Fijnaut & Paoli, 2004; Gounev & Ruggiero, 2012; Briquet & FavarelGarrigues, 2010; Ingvaldsen & Lundgren, 2009; Varese, 2010). Despite a growing journalistic interest for organized crime in Sweden, scientific work remains limited (Rostami, 2013). Some journalistic work has been published on criminal groups in Sweden, with a focus on criminal groups such as the Angels, Bandidos, Brödraskapet Wolfpack, Original Gangsters, the Naser gang, and some other groupings.13 The available material on organized crime in Sweden consists of public reports from Swedish authorities, for example the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå), the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) or the National Operations Department (previously the National Bureau of Investigation).14 From 2008, the Swedish Security Service has national responsibility to prevent, explore and obstruct organized crime from influencing the functions of the state. Several reports have been published since then, analyzing organized crime and its attempts to influence public officials, journalists, and representatives of the state through the use of threats, harassment, violence and corruption.15 An official report on organized crime was also published in 2014 (SOU 2014: 63).16 Although these reports describe different types of criminal organizations, from loose networks to more structured groupings, they do not explicitly refer to the situation in Södertälje. Therefore, the analysis in this paper builds on unique access to data from the Swedish police in the form of intelligence reports, police reports, sentences, and interviews made by 13

Wierup and Larsson (2007); Wierup and Larsson (2009). The National Bureau of Investigation (Rikskriminalpolisen) was reorganized and renamed the National Operations Department (Nationella operativa avdelningen) in 2014 in relation to a comprehensive reorganisation of the Swedish Police force. 15 Swedish Security Service (2009a); (2009b); (2012); (2014). 16 The SOU reports are the official reports presented of commissions of inquiry that are appointed by the Swedish Government for the analysis of issues in anticipation of a proposed legislation. SOU, 2014:63. 14

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one of the authors with actors within in the criminal organization.17 The Swedish police authority has written about the problems in and around Södertälje in several reports.18 The material also builds on reports from the police investigation “Operation Tore”.

5. Organized crime in Sweden During the 1990s, organized crime in Sweden mainly referred to outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCG), for example Hells Angels MC and Bandidos MC. There is a multitude of other criminal groupings that commit crime in the name of the organization or by using the organization as a cover to increase the pressure on the counterpart. These groups are described as “brotherhoods”: they share a strong criminal identity which is marked through symbols, attributes and special clothes. These groups established in Sweden in the early 1990s, mainly in the cities. Today, they are increasingly present also in smaller communities. Their activities consist of extortion, drug handling, trade with weapons etc. Other types of organized crime groups are so-called “prison gangs” which are established between detainees sharing a common background; they may for example come from the same city. Another type of criminal group could be described as networks that are based on notions of a shared origin. These groups have different organizational structures, from loose networks to more hierarchical structures (SOU 2014:62, 54; National Operations Department, 2015). The official report on organized crime also refers to political extremist grouping, such as the autonomous left and the so-called white power movements. Both have political agendas, and perceive violence and other forms of crime as legitimate methods to promote their political interests. A growing problem in Sweden is the development of territorial networks and gangs (Rostami et al, 2012). Their members are young and they have grown up in the same neighborhood. These networks build their power on violence and reputation. Feelings of segregation are important mobilizing factors. The Swedish police have identified 55 areas in 22 Swedish cities where this type of criminal network have an important impact on the local community. Three of the identified areas – Hovsjö, Ronna and Fornhöjden – are in Södertälje. A shared characteristic is that the areas are socio-economically marginalized. These groups are mainly described as loosely connected youth gangs, without strategic capacity. Older persons in these networks are more structures and involved in more advanced criminal activities. The activities mainly consist of the selling of drugs, extortion, violence, thefts and burglary. They are aggressive and hostile against public authorities in general, and against the 17 18

The data in relation to the Syriac mafia was collected by Amir Rostami. The Swedish police authority, 2012.

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police in particular. Often these groups condition social life in these areas, for example, witnesses are rarely willing to testify against local criminals.19

6. The Syriac mafia in Södertälje In media and police reports the criminal organization in Södertälje is as “the Södertälje network”, “the Södertälje mafia”, “the Syrian brotherhoods”, “the Syrian mafia”, shabakke20, or more neutrally: “serious organized crime among the criminal Syrians/Assyrians in Södertälje”.21 We use the term the Syriac mafia, since this is the term that is used by our respondents. At the same time, the organization shows several institutional analogies with other mafia-type organizations; embedded in community traditions, family ties with a strong identity grounded in territorial boundaries that capitalizes on local traditions and myths. The so-called Syriac mafia developed during a short period, since the early 1980s. The analysis that follows focuses on the criminal group organization and leadership, activities, and how ethno-religious references are used to create a stronger cohesion in the Syrian community. The article will also describe the criminal structures of social support in the community to highlight its social and territorial control. The analysis shows an organization that is informal and of network character, at the same time as there is a defined leadership and an institutionalized presence in several spheres: the church, sport clubs, business, the local government and other societal positions. Organization, leadership The words family, clan, or clan mentality, are used by Syrians themselves to describe the situation in Södertälje.22 There are mainly four families that exert an influence over the Syrian/Assyrian population in Sweden in general and southern Stockholm in particular (respondents intelligence external). The criminal organization is based on family, kinship and the notion of a common origin. There is not a single person or a particular family that leads the organization, which is based on a tradition of cooperation and exchange of services within and between the families. There is a patriarchal structure where older members of the families have more influence than younger family members. Hence, the organization builds its structure around an informal leadership based on age and the head of each family. Contacts within the organization’s inner circle are frequent, but more sporadic with the broader circle. Those who are part of the outer 19

The Swedish National Bureau of Investigation, 2014. Means ‘network’ in Arabic/Syrian. 21 Sentence B2781-10. 22 Fokus, No. 5, 2012, “Staden, familjen & makten”. 20

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circle could try to advance within the organization by acting in a way that is valued by the inner circle.23 Persons who identify themselves as Syrians and who share the ethno-religious interpretation of history has the opportunity to become part of the organization. Yet, senior positions within the criminal organization are restricted to persons directly linked to the clan through kinship. The Syriac mafia could be described as a criminal organization based on kinship, where important societal positions are distributed between families in the inner circle. The same family names appear on central positions of local congregations, associations, sport clubs, and a number of larger companies. Yet, it is also a broad network that includes a large number of individuals, and where the illegal sphere overlaps with the legal sphere. The families have positions in the public sector, for example in the municipal real-estate company and companies in the welfare sector. Through their networks they also have access to officials in public agencies, for example the local housing authority24 and the unemployment agency.25 These contacts enables fraud in relation to publicly financed elderly care, disability allowances, allowances for the employment of disabled persons, unemployment benefits, and the illegal sale of public housing contracts. Some of the activities of the criminal organization are: -

Abuse of welfare services. Abuse of social allowances for disabled persons and fraud of publicly financed elderly care services through private welfare companies. In November 2013, the municipality of Södertälje broke the contract with the company Jome care (Jome omvårdnad AB), a private company that provided elderly care. Salaries at Jome care were partly paid through unemployment benefits awarded by the unemployment agency.26

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Illegal banking services and money laundering through private financial companies and foreign exchange bureaus. In January 2014, Swedish authorities closed one of the companies due to its deficient controls of financial transfers.27

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Illegal gambling

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Match-fixing

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The sale of illegally acquired goods, for example liquor

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The Swedish police authority, 2012. Bostadsförmedlingen. 25 Arbetsförmedlingen. 26 Länstidningen 12/11 2013. ”Stor polisrazzia mot hemtjänstföretag”; Länstidningen 12/11 2013 ”Kommunen har brutit avtalet med företaget”; Länstidningen 21/11 2013 ”10,8 miljoner kronor frysta i Jomehärvan”; Länstidningen 21/11 2013 ”Polisen: Arbetsförmedlingens slarv gjorde fusket möjligt”. 27 Finansinspektionen, Press release 14/1 2014. ”FI återkallar tillståndet för Exchange Finans Europe AB”. 24

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Protection racket and extortion racket

7. Discussion The Syriac mafia in Södertälje can be understood as a criminal structure with leadership, power sharing between different families based on kinship and the notion of a common origin, but also a network that includes illegal and legal actors at different positions in society. This network/organization has been used to abuse and exploit welfare services at the local level. The organization has a high degree of organizational sophistication where legal and illegal activities tend to overlap. Similar to other criminal organizations, the Syriac mafia enjoys resources in the form of violence, which is used against rival competitors and representatives of the state. Moreover, unlike other criminal organizations in Sweden (that are non-ideological), the Syriac mafia has exploited historical and ethnoreligious symbols to build a legitimacy for its activities. It combines informal leadership with a formalized presence in several important societal institutions at the local level, for example congregations, public companies, sport clubs, associations, business, the public administration and the local government. Why did it happen in Södertälje? One obvious explanation is related to the criminal organization itself: a strong internal cohesion, broad social networks and a presence in different societal institutions have enabled an influence at the local level. Another explanation suggests that reforms of the public sector have increased the vulnerability of the state. As shown in other studies, the market reforms of the Swedish stateowned monopoly for selling alcoholic beverages (Systembolaget) increased the discretion of managers in the state-owned company, established new informal relations between managers and privately owned companies as well as increased demand for corrupt services among the companies (Castillo 2014). Yet, differences seem to be important between different municipalities and their perceived experiences of corruption (Bergh et al. 2013). In the case of Södertälje, market-oriented reforms of the welfare sector seem to have created new opportunities for fraudulent use of public resources in the form of private welfare companies. Another type of explanation points at deficient administrative procedures at the local level. Civil servants in Sweden enjoy important discretionary power to make administrative decisions, for example about social allowances. Articles in the press suggest that the administrative procedures were insufficient in combination with a lack of experience to handle this type of abuses.28 28

Länstidningen 21/11 2013, ”Polisen: Arbetsförmedlingens slarv gjorde fusket möjligt”.

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In general, the local level in Sweden is more vulnerable than the national: institutional controls are weak, media coverage is weak or non-existent at the same time as a large part of Swedish welfare services are allocated at the local level.29 The vulnerability of the Swedish welfare systems are acknowledged also at the national level. In September 2015, the Swedish government appointed a special commissioner with the task to make an analysis of the welfare state and its weaknesses/capacity to resist influence from organized and systematic economic crime.30 Another explanation is that the political level, law enforcement agencies and civil society reacted too slowly. The Syriac mafia developed over a long period of time, but it was only after the double murder at Oasen in 2010 that the massive investigative resources were mobilized. Reactions from civil society seemed to have been slow, too, in particular from the Syrian community in Södertälje. Two weeks after the double murder, a Syrian entrepreneur and local politician wrote an open letter in the local newspaper Länstidningen, criticizing his own ethnic group and encouraging them to take a position against the criminals.31 Moreover, the entrepreneur urged the Syrian and Assyrian population to “wake up from our torpor, open the eyes and stop internal quarrels in relation to the name conflict”. As argued in the introduction, Sweden represents a least likely case for the development of mafia-like organizations that affect the public sector and society in general: the political institutions are stable and present, trust in government is widespread, in combination with an organizational life that is strong and vibrant. The paper illustrates that the presence of mafia-type organizations, or criminal activities typically associated with embedded criminal organizations, is not only associated with weak states and non-functional legal systems. Like other forms of criminal organizations – OMCG, street gangs, highly organized crime projects – which develop in countries with stable political institutions, high trust in government and strong civil society, the rise of mafia-like organizations is a complex process and cannot solely be explained by an absence of strong political institutions. We argue that more attention should be paid to study and compare the emergence of mafia-type organizations in different contexts. With an increased understanding of the dynamics of criminal organizations we can increase our ability to prevent their proliferation. 29

Transparency International Sverige, 2012. In November 2015, the municipality in Södertälje organized a seminar about criminality in the welfare sector to discuss how to prevent, discover and stop criminality in relation to publicly financed services. See ”Seminarium om kriminalitet i välfärden. http://www.sodertalje.se/Nyheter/Seminarium-kring-kriminalitet-i-valfarden-/. 7 December, 2015. 30 Ministry of Justice, Press release 24/9 2015. 31 Länstidningen 19/7 2010, “Syrianer och assyrier – vakna och stå upp för Södertälje”.

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